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The development of American history is often described in terms of cycles. The 
general idea is that periods of social activism alternate, in a reasonably pre- 
dictable pattern, with periods of private concern. The pendulum, so we are 
repeatedly told, commonly swings from liberalism to conservatism, from reform 
to reaction, from public purpose to private interest. The terminology varies and 
does not always convey a sense of clarity or precision. 
Henry Adams, writing in the 1890s, applied the cyclical thesis to the first years 
of the American republic. According to him a period of about twelve years 
measured the beat of the pendulum. Arthur Schlesinger Sr., in an essay published 
half a century later, identified no less than eleven alternations "between periods 
of concern for the rights of the few and periods of concern for the wrongs of the 
many."' The average length of the periods was, Schlesinger noted, almost 
seventeen years. 
According to conventional wisdom, we have so far seen six political cycles 
during the twentieth century: the Progressive era, 1901-1919; the Republican 
restoration, 1919-1931; the New Deal era 1932-1947; the reaction against 
liberalism during the 1950s; the dynamism of the New Frontier and the Great 
Society in the 1960s; and the revival of conservatism in the 1970s and 1980s, 
reaching a peak in the election of Ronald Reagan. Of course, this way of 
structuring history is simplistic and open to a number of objections. Still it may 
be useful, if only for educational purposes. 
The swing of the pendulum usually carries with it substantial changes in 
terms of both policies and voter attitudes. During the years of the Reagan 
Administration, however, this pattern has only partially been visible. True, the 
Reagan program meant the biggest and most far-reaching set of policy changes 
since the New Deal. But these changes have not been supported by a majority 
of the voting public. 
Scores of public-opinion polls show that the American people, contrary to 
widely held beliefs, have not moved to the right during the last decade or so. 
Instead, the recent "right turn" in American politics is a consequence of a 
realignment of business elites. 
This bold and rather novel thesis is put forward in Right Turn. Those who 
wish to keep up-to-date with the how's and why's of contemporary U.S. politics 
cannot afford to neglect this work. Ferguson and Rogers present an interesting 
analysis of some of the most important current trends, most notably the decay 
of the Democratic Party and the rise to power of a well organized, business- 
dominated center-right party system. Furthermore, the book is well written and 
invokes objections on the part of the reader by virtue of its straightforward and 
closely argumentative style. 
In the first chapter we are introduced to some influential businessmen, bankers, 
and intellectuals, who purport to be Democrats but whose prime objective is to 
shift the party's course to the right. The authors label them "revisionists," and 
describe their policy goals as being close to those of conservative Republicans. 
Ferguson and Rogers try to argue - and I think quite successfully - that many 
of the revisionists' claims are either false or dubious. 
The revisionists' central argument is that the American voters have now 
broken with the policies and aims of the New Deal. People no longer believe in 
social spending programs, an active state, business regulation, redressing income 
and welfare inequalities, etc. The Democratic Party must follow suit and change 
its policies accordingly. 
Ferguson and Rogers agree that the policy initiatives of the Reagan years 
announce the end of the New Deal era in American politics. The "New Deal 
party system," they argue, has finally collapsed. The American political system 
has "realigned," as political scientists often put it. 
Still the authors insist that mass public sentiment has not turned against the 
domestic programs of the New Deal, or even the most important components 
of the Great Society, The basic structure of public opinion in the United States 
has remained quite stable in recent years. Moreover, within this basic structure 
the main trend in public opinion over the past generation has been toward greater 
liberalism. Thus, there "has been no right turn in public opinion corresponding to 
the right turn in public policy" (p. 13). In sum, there has been policy realignment 
but no voter realignment. 
Ferguson and Rogers' survey of public-opinion polls seems on the whole to 
confirm their argument. For instance, during Reagan's first term public support 
for regulatory and social programs actually increased. A 1983 poll, for example, 
showed that only 5 percent of Americans found regulations "too strict," while 
42 percent thought they were "not strong enough." Support of social spending 
programs was similarly broad. In early 1983,74 percent of the public supported 
jobs programs even if it meant increasing the size of the federal deficit. A 
January 1986 survey found, furthermore, that voter attitudes showed "no con- 
sistent evidence of change, certainly not in a conservative direction," over the 
course of the Reagan Presidency (p. 16). 
The picture does not fundamentally change when we turn to foreign policy. 
A clear majority of the public has been against the Administration's policy as 
regards El Salvador and Nicaragua. In 1984 no less than 67 percent were opposed 
to the mining of Nicaragua's harbors by the U.S. Despite Ronald Reagan's 
frequent talk about the Soviet Union as an "evil empire," survey data indicate 
that overwhelming majorities of Americans, while continuing to disapprove of 
the Soviet system of government, are very reluctant to prompt a showdown with 
the U.S.S.R. and urgently wish to live at peace with it. 
The authors also address the widespread notion that Ronald Reagan is the 
most popular President during the entire postwar period. This contention is 
simply false, if opinion polls are to be trusted. During his first term in office, 
Reagan's approval rating averaged 50 percent, which was lower than the averages 
for Eisenhower (69%), Kennedy (7l%), Johnson (52%), and Nixon (56%). 
Jimmy Carter, who has been described as an especially unpopular President, 
had an average of 47 percent. 
Reagan's peak had been reached as early as March 1981, when he recorded 
a 68 percent approval rating. That is not a particularly impressive figure. Four 
out of five other elected postwar Presidents achieved significantly higher peaks - 
Eisenhower (79%), Kennedy (83%), Johnson (SO%), and Carter (75%). Why 
these data have not been more widely discussed and reported in the media 
remains a mystery. 
There is, however, a puzzling problem here. If Reagan does not have a magical 
hold over the American electorate, and if his policies are not very popular among 
a majority of the voters, then how did he succeed in winning two landslide 
victories in the Presidential elections of 1980 and 1984? Ferguson and Rogers 
explain this by referring to one critical issue: the economy. They view the 1980 
election as a referendum on Carter's bad economic performance. Four years 
later, during an economic boom, the Democrats offered no alternative but 
Walter Mondale's promise to raise taxes. Faced with a choice between someone 
who promised them little besides higher taxes and someone who rhetorically 
championed economic growth and lower taxes, the voters, quite rationally, 
opted for the i n c ~ m b e n t . ~  
On the whole this seems like a plausible line of reasoning. Several studies 
confirm the importance of economic performance in voter approval of elected 
officials, in the U.S. and elsewhere. But this does not exhaustively explain the 
Reagan phenomenon. What we have here is a complex set of voter attitudes 
and emotions, which go beyond the concern for jobs, inflation, income increases, 
and so on. These attitudes, which must be taken into account when dealing with 
Reagan's apparent success, are seldom discernible in ordinary polls. 
The most interesting segments of the book deal with the crucial role of money 
in American politics. The authors' description of a right-of-center business group 
within the Democratic Party, with a dominant influence upon the nomination 
and election of candidates, is especially intriguing. 
Ferguson and Rogers' conclusion, however, is more debatable. They argue 
that the new and more conservative political order, which has emerged during 
the 1970s and 1980s, is likely to be maintained. Those social forces who are 
interested in altering it are simply too weak to do so. "America," so the study 
ends, "will continue its right turn" (p. 219). 
This strikes me as being not too optimistic or pessimistic but, rather, too 
deterministic. Politics is determined not only by existing structures and the role 
of politicians within those structures, it is also shaped by ideas, debates, and 
passionate opinion-making. In an age of conservatism and free-market phil- 
osophies, notions of fairness, justice and equality have been fighting an uphill 
battle. But that may soon change. The heavy pendulum of history, after a period 
of careful examination of existing circumstances, usually tends to alter its 
position. 
Erik Asard Uppsala University 
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